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NOTES
THE LAW SCHOOL-The year's enrollment is 7.4 per cent. below that
of 1931-32.1 The entering class is but three less than last year's registration,
the major loss being in the Second and Third years, which are now feeling the
effect of smaller original enrollments. 2 We again record a growing proportion
of First Year students from the State of Pennsylvania outside the metropolitan
area of Philadelphia.3 By the generous grant of scholarships both free and loan
and by an effective organization of University work suitable for student part-
time jobs, everything possible has been done to ease the financial situation of de-
serving students.
Professor Alexander Hamilton Frey, A. B., J. S. D., who was a Visiting
Professor in 1930-31 returns to us from Duke University Law School as full
time professor in charge of the courses in Business Associations. He announces
important changes in the program for these courses. Instead of teaching Part-
nerships exclusively as a Second Year course and Corporations exclusively as
a Third Year course, the fundamentals of organization and the rights and lia-
bilities of all forms of business associations will be covered in one year; in the
second year of the course those students desiring more specialized and intensive
training will be carried into the problems of corporate reorganization, merger,
finance and accounting. This year the teaching of Third Year Corporations will
be carried on without much change of content, Thomas K. Finletter, Esq., of
New York, conducting a seminar in advanced phases of the subject.
1 1931-32 enrollment was 443; this year's enrollment is 411. The loss last year was
about n1%.
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2 CLASS DismmuTIox
1931-32 1932-33
First Year 182 179
Second Year 128 119
Third Year 124 105
Graduate and Unclassified 9 8
443 4"1
'Institutional and geographical distribution of the First Year:
DEGREE DISTRIBUTION, FIRST YEAR CLASS
versity of Pennsylvania: Franklin and Marshall 6 Princeton
allege 24 Georgetown 4 Rutgers
lharton 31 Gettysburg I St. Joseph's
fiscellaneous I Grove City I St. Thomas
- 56 Harvard 2 Susquehanna
er Institutions: Haverford 4 Swarthmore
.mherst I Lafayette 6 Syracuse
ucknell I Lehigh 5 Temple
atholic University of Michigan University I Trinity
America I Moravian I Ursinus
entre 2 Muhlenberg 5 Villanova
lark I Oregon State Agri- Williams
ornell 2 cultural College I Wesleyan
elaware University I Pennsylvania Military I Yale
ickinson 3 Pennsylvania State 8
Drexel Institute I
31+% from University of Pennsylvania.
68+% from other institutions.
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
1931-32
Philadelphia 41+%
Pennsylvania (outside Philadelphia) 42+%
Other States and foreign countries 15+%
Total
1932-33
38+%
48+%
13+9o
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Professor Fowler V. Harper of the Law School of the University of Indi-
ana has come as a Harrison Research Fellow. He is working with Professor
Bohlen in Tort law and they are jointly conducting a Seminar in advanced prob-
lems in Torts open to a selected group of Third Year students-
The Library's growing' collection of Public and Private International Law
has been separately housed in the Henry Reed Hatfield Rooms adjoining Mc-
Murtrie Hall. Mr. Hatfield, of the Philadelphia Bar, was a generous donor
towards the special Law School Fund raised in 1928. A finely equipped Period-
ical Room has also been added during the past year.
"Soviet Administration of Criminal Law", by Judah Zelitch, LL. M. 1932
(Gowen Fellow), appeared from the University of Pennsylvania Press in De-
cember last and has received very favorable notice in serious law journals both of
this country and of Europe.
The July Pennsylvania Bar examinations resulted in 89+7o of passes out
of 1O9 examinees.
Herbert F. Goodrich.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF AUTO-MOBILE OWNERS FOR ACTS OF GRATUITOUS
BAILES- -Deaths due to motor vehicle accidents in the year 1931 reached the
almost unbelievable total of 33,500.1 The persons injured numbered almost a
a million and the property damage is estimated at two and one-half billions of
dollars.2  It is not surprising therefore to find courts treating automobiles as
dangerous instrumentalities in sustaining regulatory legislation as coming within
the police power,3 as well as for various other purposes.4 It is, however, an
astonishing fact- that no court today bases the liability of an automobile owner
for the damage done by his automobile on the familiar legal ground that he is
the owner of a dangerous instrumentality,' and this despite the fact that owners
of railroad trains which took toll of but one-fourth as- many lives in the same
period 6 are held liable as owners of dangerous instrumentalities. 7  Florida, in
'ACCIDENT FACTS (1932). Prepared by National Safety Council, Chicago, Ill.
-TREIE NDOUS TRIFLES (1932). Prepared by Travelers Insurance Co., Hartford, Conn.
The number of injured was estimated as 997,6oo.
' Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927) ; Opinion of Justices, 251
Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681 (1925) ; Bessan v. Public Service, 135 Misc. 368, 237 N. Y. Supp.
689 (1929).
'District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63, 51 Sup. Ct. 52 (1930) (automobile is dan-
gerous instrumentality; therefore, driving it carelessly is a grave offense, a crime within
article III of the Constitution guaranteeing a jury trial) ; Schweinhart v. Flaherty, 49 F.
(2d) 533 (App. D. C. 1931) (dangerous character of automobile extends ambit of servant's
scope of employment for which master is liable).
' In almost every case in which it is sought to impose vicarious liability on an. automobile
owner, the court rules out liability based on the dangerous instrumentality doctrine as one
possible solution. See Note (192o) 16 A. L. R. 27o; Shipp v. Davis, 141 So. 366 (Ala.
1932). The reasoning of the court in Lewi§ v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50, 59 S. E. 338 (1907)
is typical of that found in many cases, says the court at page 55, 59 S. E. at 340, "It
is insisted in argument that automobiles are to be classed with ferocious animals, and that
the law relating to the duty of the owner of such animals is to be applied. It is not the
ferocity of automobiles that is to be feared, but the ferocity of those who drive them. Until
human agency intervenes, they are usually harmless. While by reason of the rate of pay
allotted to the judges of this state, few if any have ever owned one of these machines, yet
some of them have occasionally ridden in them, thereby acquiring some knowledge of them;
and we have, therefore, found out that there are times when these machines not only lack
ferocity, but assume such an indisposition to go that it taxes the limit of human ingenuity to
make them move at all. They are not to be classed with bad dogs, vicious bulls, evil disposed
mules and the like."
' COMPENSATION REPoRT, infra note 46, p. 18.
"But the immunity from tort [where the tort arises from the wanton and wilful act
of the servant] is not generally extended to railroads, whose servants are entrusted with such
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1920, announced the doctrine of liability in this situation, on the basis of dan-
gerous instrumentality.8 That this was never followed in any other jurisdic-
tion may account for the fact that in a series of recent cases 9 in which Florida
has once again had an opportunity to review this situation, it has changed its
stand, so that while still recognizing the dangerous character of an automobile,
it no longer bases liability on the common law ground of dangerous instrumen-
tality.
The method by which the Florida court reaches the same conclusion on a
different theory is both novel and interesting. It points out that the statutes of
Florida recognize that the auto is a more dangerous agency than a "hammer,
horse and buggy, or wheelbarrow" since it has been declared subject to special
statutory regulation as to use not imposed on these other instrumentalities. One
mode of regulation is a requirement that the owner shall register his vehicle and
obtain a license to operate it on the public highways.'0 The court concludes that
since no one has a right to use the auto except pursuant to the owner's license,
it follows that if the owner chooses voluntarily to entrust his car and license to
another for the purpose of operation, he makes that other an agent and thus
becomes liable for his acts or omissions under the doctrine of "respondeat supe-
rior." Any other result, according to this court, "would be to practically defeat
the statutory intent and purpose which is obvious in requiring cars to be regis-
tered in the name of the owner." 11
This extraordinary theory achieves the same result as that reached in the
earlier case of Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson "2 by means of the danger-
ous instrumentality doctrine. A much more devious process of reasoning is em-
ployed, however, but one which nevertheless will not stand up under close scru-
tiny. The statutory intent seems clear, especially in view of recent amendments,'
3
that it is the registering of the car and not the owner which is required.' 4 This
makes the entire reasoning of the court illogical inasmuch as the liability is im-
posed on owners by means of discovery of a legislative intent in these licensing
laws. It is an interesting commentary that despite the prevalence of licensing
dangerous instrumentalities and have thereby such unusual and extensive means qf doing mis-
chief." Stewart v. Cary Lumber Co., 146 N. C. 47 at 49, 59 S. E. 545 at 546 (go97) ; accord:
Euting v. Chicago Ry., 1i6 Wis. 13, 92 N. W. 358 (902).
'Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 8o Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
'Herr v. Butler, ioi Fla. 125, 132 So. 815 (i93i); Engleman v. Traeger, 136 So. 527
(Fla. I93I); Greene v. Miller, 136 So. 532 (Fla. 193i); cf. Williams v. Younghusband, 57
F. (2d) -39 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) where the federal circuit court sitting in Florida decided
that an automobile owner is not liable for the negligence of a gratuitous bailee, although admit-
ting that the language of the Florida court* made such a distinction. It distinguished the
case at bar from the Florida cases, supra, on the ground that it involved a gratuitous bailee
while the other cases involved persons who were servants, agents or relatives. An examina-
tion of these cases, however, shows that the servants Were outside the scope of their employ-
ment, Engleman v. Traeger, supra; Eppinger v. Trembly, g0 Fla. 145, io6 So. 879 (1925), and
the son in one case at least was not a member of the owner's family within the meaning of
the family purpose doctrine. Herr v. Butler, supra. The cases are, therefore, indistinguish-
able.
a°A. Com[p. LAWS (1927) § 1281.
= Engleman v. Traeger, supra note 9, at 531.
' Supra note 8.
"Fla. Laws i931, c. 15625.
"Brown, A Comment on the Ditties and Respowibilities of a Motor Vehicle Owner in
Florida (1932) 5 FLA. STATE BAR Ass'N L. J. 469. Mr. Brown in his comment also points
out that if the court persists in its doctrine it may be open to challenge on constitutional
grounds since the registration, which is the basis of liability, is required only of residents of
Florida. In imposing liability, therefore, the court would unfairly discriminate in favor of
non-residents of the state, a. purely arbitrary distinction and as such invalid under decisions
like Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 582 (1931) ; Louisville, etc. v. Coleman, 277
U. S. 32, 48 Sup. Ct. 423 (0928).
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statutes , (very similar to those in force in Florida) no other court has discov-
ered from these statutes a legislative intent to make an owner liable for the neg-
ligence of one driving his car with his knowledge and consent."6
, Obviously, this is a device to reach the result of imposing vicarious liability
on automobile owners where neither ordinary principles of agency nor the class-
ical tort view of liability for fault only would impose liability. The same desire is
to be seen in other jurisdictions. Some seventeen courts have adopted what is
known as the "family purpose" doctrine." This is. to the effect that, where the
head of the family purchases an automobile for the use of members of his fam-
ily as well as himself, members of the family when usiiig the car for their own
enjoyment are quasi-agents, at least to the extent of making the head of the fam-
ily liable for their negligence in operating the car."8 These courts reason that he
(the owner) has made their enjoyment his "affair and business" and when they
are using the "family auto" with his consent and knowledge for their own pur-
poses they are furthering his business." Other courts, greater in number than
those just considered,' 0 (despite the remarks in many cases that a majority of
a'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§2621 (6), 2621 (9); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 75, § 92a; TENN. CODE (Williams, Shannon, Harsh, 1932) § 1149.
'Tyson v. Frutchey, 194 N. C. 75o, 140 S. E. 718 (1927) ;Piquet v. Wazelle, 288 Pa.
463, 136 Atl. 787 (1927) ; Scates v. Sandefer, 163 Tenn. 558, 44 S. W. (2d) 310 (1932).
'Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 Pac. 966 (1919) ; Boyd v. Close, 82 Colo. 15o, 257
Pac. 1O79 (1927) ; Maher v. Fahy, 112 Conn. 76, 151 Atl. 318 (193o); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga.
App. 487, 156 S. E. 474 (i93i) ; Baldwin v. Parsons, 193 Iowa 75, 186 N. W. 665 (1922) ;
Wallace v. Hall, 32 S. W. (2d) 324 (Ky. 193o); Pearson v. Northland, 184 Minn. 560, 239
N. W. 6o2 (i31) ; Dow v. Legg, 12o Neb. 271, 231 N. W. 747 (193o) ; Boes v. Howell, 24
N. M. 142, 173 Pac. 966 (1918) ; Grier v. Woodside, 2oo N. C. 759, 158 S. E. 491 (I93 ;
Carpenter v. Dunnell, 61 N. D. 263, 237 N. W. 779 (ig3i) ; Foster v. Farra, 117 Ore. 286,
243 Pac. 278 (1926) (with which cf. McDowell v. Hurner, 13 P. (2d) 6oo, 6oi (Ore. 1932)) ;
Mooney v. Gilreath, 124 S. C. I, 117 S. E. 186 (1923) ; Manhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272,
17 S. W. (2d) 5 (1929) (motorcycle) ; Trice v. Bridgewater, 51 S. W. (2d) 797 (Tex. 1932) ;
Hanson v. Eilers, 164 Wash. 185, 2 P. (2d) 719 (i3i) ; Watson v. Bailey, 1O5 W. Va. 416,
143 S. E. 95 (19310.
"Those courts which actually accept the family purpose doctrine should be distinguished
from those which appear to do so in cases where the real basis of the decision is an agency
relationship between owner and operator. This is particularly true where one member of the
family is driving other members. There the operator is very often engaged in the owner's
affairs (which according to well accepted principles of agency law need not be business
affairs, as witness a family chauffeur) and is not going about in his own interest. There is,
therefore, no necessity to invoke the family purpose doctrine to impose liability. This con-
fusion is apparent in Note (193o) 64 A. L. R. 844, 848, where courts are cited as' accepting
the family purpose doctrine in jurisdictions which actually do not accept the doctrine, see
supra note 17; cf. 7 & 8 HUDDY, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAw (1931) 312 et seq.
" "The family car doctrine has from time to time had various theories for its foundation
among them being (a) family relationship; (b) ownership of the automobile; (c) dangerous
instrumentality; and (d) principal and agent or master and servant. It originally sprang
from the idea that an automobile was a dangerous instrumentality . . . notwithstanding
this idea has been abandoned, the proposition of law established under such mistaken belief
still remains." Alexander, J. (dissenting) in Trice v. Bridgewater, 51 S. W. (2d) 797 at
8o (Ky. 1932); accord, Kennedy v. Wolf, 221 Ky. III, 298 S. W. 188 (1927).
' Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 6o So. 15o (1912) ; Featherstone v. Jackson, 183 Ark.
373, 36 S. WA. (2d) 405 (i931) ; Idemoto v. Scheidecker, 193 Cal. 653, 226 Pac. 922 (1924) ;
Smith v. Callahan, 144 Atl. 46 (Del. 1928) ; Anderson v. Byrnes,.344 Il. 240, 176 N. E. 374
1931 ; McGoran v. Cromwell, 86 Ind. App. 107, 156 N. E. 413 (1927) ; Daily v. Schneider,
118 Kan. 295, 234 Pac. 951- (1925); Davis v. Shaw, 142 So. 301 (La. App. 1932) ; Robinson
v. Warren, 151 Atl. io (Me. 1930) ; Schneider v. Schneider, 16o Md. IS, 152 Ati. 498 (1930) ;
Field v. Evans, 262 Mass. 315, 159 N. E. 751 (1928) ; Loehr v. Abell, 174 Mich. 59o, 140 N.
W. 926 (1913) ; Smith v. Dauber, 155 Miss. 694, 125 So. 1O2 (1929) ; Murphy v. Loeffler, 327
MO. 1244, 39 S. V. (2d) 550 (193); Clauson v. Schroeder, 63 Mont. 488, 208 Pac. 924
(1922) ; Lafond v. Richardson, 84 N. H. 288, 149 AtI. 6oo (193o) ; Missell v. Hayes, 86
N. J. L. 348, 91 Atl. 322 (1914); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 22o N. Y. III, 115 N. E. 443
(1917) ; Bretzfelder v. Demaree. 1O2 Ohio lO5, 13o N. E. 505 (1921) ; Schmitt v. Dier, III
Okla. 23, 238 Pac. 410 (1925) ; Piquet v. Wazelle, 288 Pa. 463, 136 Atl. 787 (1927); Landry
v. Richmond, 45 R. I. 504, 124 Atl. 263 (1924) ; Behseleck v. Andrus, S. D. Sup. Ct., Sept.
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courts have adopted the doctrine) 21 do not accept the family purpose doctrine
though accepting the same principles of the law of agency which are generally
said to be the basis of the family purpose doctrine. They decide logically that
calling a man an agent of another, while he is taking care of his own affairs, is
a contradiction in terms 22 and since the parent-owner is liable neither because
of his relationship 23 nor his ownership 24 he is not liable at all. These courts
recognize that the real reason behind the acceptance of the doctrine is the- real-
ization of the dangerous quality of the automobile and since they do not base lia-
bility on the dangerous instrumentality 25 doctrine they feel logically bound to
reject the family purpose doctrine.26  They also point out that this illogical
method of thought does not appear in any other field of law except that in which
an automobile is concerned.2 7  Thus, this time by means of the family purpose
doctrine, we again find the courts reaching a conclusion not sanctioned by con-
servative legal precedent but one more likely to reach a preferable social result
in view of the fact noted by many courts that in a majority of cases the use of
this device is the only means of finding a defendant capable of compensating
for the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
2 3
Another method used to impose vicarious liability on automobile owners,
in disregard of accepted principles of tort and agency law is illustrated by the
recent case of Gouchec v. Wagner.
2'0 That case decides that irrespective of sec-
tion 59 of the N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law,
3° an owner of an automobile, rid-
10, 1932; McFarlane v. Winters, 47 Utah 598, 155 Pac. 437 (I916) ; Jones v. Knapp, I56 Atl.
399 (Vt. 1931) ; Blair v. Broadwater, 121 Va. 301, 93 S. E. 632 (1917) ; Papke v. Haerle,
x89 Wis. I56, 207 N. W. 261 (1926).
' Hope, The Doctrine of the Family Auitonwbile (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 359, 360; BERY,
AuTomOBIrES (6th ed. 1930) § 1473; 20 R. C. L. 629. But cf. Lattin, Vicarious Liability
and the Family Automobile (1928) 26 Micn. L. REv. 846, 85I, where the author shows that
the family purpose doctrine was never accepted by a majority of courts, but suggests that
numerous repetitions of the statement that "the great weight of authority supports the family
purpose doctrine" may have been instrumental in establishing that doctrine in courts: of first
impression.
IArkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E. 30 (1919) ; Stumpf v. Montgomery, ioi Okla.
257, 226 Pac. 65 (1914).
' Cruse-Crawford Co. v. Rucker, 22o Ala. IOI, 123 So. 897 (1929) ; Olson v. Ames Co.,
195 Iowa 419, 192 N. W. 143 (1923) ; Flaherty v. Helfont, 123 Me. 134, 122 Atl. 18o (1923);
Khoury v. Edison Co., 265 Mass. 236, 164 N. E. 77 (1928).
" King v. Smythe, 14o Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296 (1918) ; McFarlane v. Winters, supra
note 20.
'Arkin v. Page, supra note 22; Vatkins v. Clark, 1O3 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. 131 (1918).
' Clauson v. Schroeder, Smith v. Callahan, both supra note 20; Watson v. Clark, supra
note 25.
C1 See Smith v. Callahan, supra note 2o, at 49; Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754, 761,
71 Atl. 296, 299 (19o8) ; Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, supra note 20, at 115, 115 N. E. at 445;
Felcyn v. Gamble, 241 N. W. 37 (Minn. 1932) decides that the family purpose doctrine is
not applicable to motor boats.
"A judgment for damages against an infant daughter or an infant son, or a son with-
out support and property, who is living as a member of the family, would be an empty
,form. . . . The dictates of natural justice should require that the owner should be re-
sponsible for its negligent operation." King v. Smythe, supra note 24, at 226, 204 S. W. at
298; accord: Watson v. Burley, 105 W. Va. 416, 143 S. E. 95 (1928).
:257 N. Y. 344, 178 N. E. 553 (1931).
"Every owner of a motor vehicle . . . shall be liable and responsible for death or
injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor ve-
hicle . . . by any person legally using or operating the same with the permission express
or implied of such owner."
The court said at page 348, 178 N. E. at 554, "When the respondent [owner] entered the
car, he regained dominion over it, and the rule applicable under the statute in the absence of
the owner ceased to apply." The court appears to regard it as still an open question whether
the statute carries the owner's responsibility so far as to make his gratuitous licensee's neg-
ligence a bar to his own recovery. Cf. (1931) 31 COL. L. R-.v. 1193, where it is, suggested
that a proper interpretation of the statute does not require an imputation of negligence coin-
cident with the imposition of liability.
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ing with a person, Whether a member of his family or a stranger, whom he per-
mits to drive, is liable, because of his ownership and presence, for any injury
done by the permittee's negligent driving, and furthermore is barred by such
negligence from recovery against a third person whose negligence concurs with
that of the driver in bringing about an injury to the owner. This doctrine has
been announced by other courts 31 and deserves careful attention in determining
whether there is any merit in it.
By the common law of New York mere ownership is not enough to make
the owner responsible for one whom he merely permits to drive his car,3" the
owner's presence in the car being required in order that the driver's negligence
should have the above-mentioned effects. The basis of liability cannot therefore
depend on the right to control since according to well settled principles of that
part of the law of agency relating to master and servant, once granted the mas-
ter has the right to control, then whether or not he is present to exercise that right
is immaterial. The presence of the owner being required for liability, it would
seem then that his power to control is all important. In the present case the facts
are not clear but it appears that defendant's wife, who was driving, and his
mother-in-law sat in the front of the car while the defendant occupied a back
seat.33 This indicates that he had a limited power, if any, to observe the manner
in which the car was driven. On this point, courts seem to be in accord that there
is no duty for anyone, owner or otherwise, to be on the alert to do back seat
driving.34 The court itself says that the power of control is unimportant and that
"The mere fact that he (defendant) chose to sit in the rear seat and refrained
from directing its (the car's) operation did not change his rights or limit his
liability." " We are therefore forced to the conclusion that neither the right to
control nor the power to control is the basis of liability in this situation.
It is, then, again evident that the basis of vicarious liability lies outside the
field of both tort and agency law and seems to be a doctrine developed to meet
the exigencies of the peculiar situation where one for whom an owner is not
ordinarily liable causes an injury through the use of the auto. The statutory
law shows an even more distinct trend in this direction3 Since the first statute
on the subject in Michigan in 19o9 37 other jurisdictions have passed statutes
' 1Fuller v. Metcalf, 125 Me. 77, 13o At. 875 (1925) ; Risser v. Parr, i8o Iowa 1146, 168
N. W. 865 (1918). The court in the Maine case said, "You shall not be permitted to shuffle
yourself down to the bottom of the pack as a mere, passenger and turn up a probably im-
pecunious and irresponsible driver as the only person subject to liability." Contra: Beaudoin
y. Mahaney, 159 Ati. 567 (Me. 1932) which holds that the owner can give up the right to
control although present and establish a bailor-bailee relationship.
'Fisher v. International Ry., 112 Misc. 212, 182 N. Y. Supp. 313 (1920); Fallon v.
Swackha;ner, 226 N. Y. 444, 123 N. E. 737 (1919).
=257 N. Y. at 345, 178 N. E. at 553.
' See Southern Pacific Co. v. Wright, 248 Fed. 261, 264; Chambers v. Hawkins, 233 Ky.
211, 214, 25 S. W. (2d) 363, 364 (193o) ; Kirkpatrick v. Phila. R. T., 290 Pa. 288, 298, 138
Atl. 830, 834 (1927).
257 N. Y. at 348, 178 N. E. at 554.
Some of the more important articles showing this trend are Heyting, Automobiles and
Vicarious Liability (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 225; Heyting, Automobiles and Compulsory Lia-
bility Insurance (930) 16 A. B. A. J. 362; Heyting, Statutory Liability of Automobile In-
surance Companies (931) 37 A, B. A. J. 362; Dowling, Motor Vehicle Statutes: "Hit and
Run"; Service of Process on Non-Residents (I933) I7 A. B. A. J. 796; Note (193) Vicari-
ous Liability: Statutes as a Guide to Its Basis, 45 HARv. L. REv. 171 at 173.
In the case of airplanes, the idea of liability without fault seems to be an accepted fact;
see UNIFORM STATE LAW FOR AERONAUTICS, § 5. For a discussion of liability both at com-
mon law and under statute, see ROLFING, NATIONAL REGULATION OF AERONAUTICS (1931)
252 et seq.
I MICH. PuB. AcTs 3909, No. 318, § 10 (3). This statute was declared unconstitutional
in Daugherty v. Thomas, I74 Mich. 371, 14o N. W. 61S (913), on the ground that it im-
posed liability on the owner even though he did not consent to the use of the car and that this
was not a necessary regulation in the exercise of the police power. The present act, infra note
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imposing on a car owner liability for the negligence of one driving his automo-
bile with his knowledge and consent.38 This regulation has been upheld as con-
stitutional being within the police power of the state, since an automobile is such
a dangerous instrumentality." Other jurisdictions have imposed the same sort
of liability where the permittee is a lessee 4o and again where he is a minor." An-
other type of statute, showing the same trend is that which gives the injured
plaintiff a lien on the car by the negligent driving of which he was injured.-
2
The customary method of writing insurance policies for owners, to cover
the negligence of those whom they permit to drive,
43 has the effect of enforcing
a vicarious liability on automobile owners since it is they who pay the insurance
premiums. This form of policy is made mandatory on every motorist in the
state of Massachusetts under the Compulsory Insurance Act of 1925.:  The
same sort of policy is required by Financial Responsibility Acts, adopted in
many jurisdictions, 15 in the case of a motorist who has been guilty of negli-
gence in a prior accident.
A further plan for the vicarious liability of automobile owners has recently
been advanced by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Acci-
dents of Columbia University.4 6  After a study running over a period of two
38, does not have this objectionable feature since it imposes liability only where the operator
drives with the consent of the owner. This was declared constitutional in Stapleton v. Inde-
pendent Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 364 N. W. 520 (1917).
'IowA CODE (93) § 5026; MIcr. Co ap. LAWS (1929) §4648; N. Y. VEH. & TR.
LAW (1929) § 59; R. 1. Pub. Laws 1929-30, c. 1429, § io. For a discussion of the ambiguous
Rhode Island statute, see Heyting, supra note 36, 16 A. B. A. J. 225, at pp. 226-227.
Opinion of the Justices, supra note 3; Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co., supra
note 37.
,"CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) -§ 1627; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) C. 29, § 99. In Arizona,
Illinois, and New Jersey, acts requiring compulsory insurance covering lessees achieve the
same result. ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1649; ILL. Rav. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) c. 95a,
§ 47 (1) ; N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1930) § 135-108.
' ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1671 (under IS years of age); Del. Laws 1929, C.
10, § 72 (18 years) ; Idaho Session Laws 1929, C. 274, § I (16 years) ; IOWA CODE (1927)
§ 5026 (I5 years); ME REv. STAT. (1930) C. 29, § 35 (IS years); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 75, § 211 (16 years).
ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 1397 (152) (insurance required between ages of 16 and I8)
CONN. GEN. STAT. (930) §§ 1590-1592 (under 16 years and unaccompanied by an adult);
ef. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 193) Act 5128, §§ 61, 62 (minor required to have adult sign
his license application and adult so signing jointly liable with minor).
'S. C. CiV. CODE (1932) § 8785; TENN. CODE (Williams, Shannon, Harsh, 1932) § 3o79a,
197; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 193o) § 2145 (74).
SUNDERLEIN, AuTo OBILE INSURANCE (i929) §§ 926-931; 13-14 HUDDY, supra note i8,
at 41o. For statutory requirements of so-called omnibus coverage clause, see infra note 45.
" MASS. Cuax. STAT. (927) c. 90, §§ iA, 34A-341 (Mass. Acts 1925, c. 346). For a
discussion see Compensation Report, infra note 46, c. VII.
'CAT_ GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 5128, §§ 36Y2, 36 4; Ind. Acts 1931, c. 179, § 12;
ME. REv. STAT. (930) c. 29, § gi; Md. Laws 1931, c. 498 (i87m) ; Neb. Laws 1931, c. IOS
(22c) ; N. Y. VEr. & TR. LAW (1929) § 94; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 2621 (112)
(123) ; N. D. Laws 1929, c. 163.
The following states have Financial Responsibility Laws also fashioned after that spon-
sored by the American Automobile Association, but the insurance policy need not contain an
omnibus clause covering those operating the automobile with the consent of the insured.
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § i6og; Del. Laws 1931, c. 14; N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1930)
§ 135, 119; R. I. Laws 1929, c. 1429; still others merely demand a bond covering the delin-
quent driver or owner. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 272o-6I; S. D. Session Laws 1931,
c. 179. Three other jurisdictions merely require that past judgments be satisfied: Iowa
Laws 1929, c. 118; N. H. Laws 1927, c. 54; Wis. Laws 1929, c. 76. These latter statutes be-
come important as regards vicarious liability only when by some other method vicarious lia-
bility is imposed on the delinquent motorist who falls within the mandatory provisions of the
statute. For a discussion of these statutes see COMPENSATION REPORT, infra notd 46, c. VI,
and HYTING, supra note 36, 16 A. B. A. J. 362.
" The Committee recently submitted a report, dated February I, 1932, to the Columbia
University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, entitled-REPoRT BY THE COM!MITTEE
TO STUDY COMPENSATION Fon AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS. For a detailed discussion of the ad-
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years the committee came to the conclusion that the present theory of liability
in automobile cases was entirely inadequate from a social point of view and sug-
gested a plan placing an even greater legal liability on the automobile owner
than any court has yet evolved. "The general purpose of the compensation plan
is to impose on the owners of motor vehicles a limited liability, without regard
to fault, for personal injury or death caused by the operatibn of their motor
vehicles. The liability to pay rests primarily on the owner of the motor vehicle
and the plan provides security for this liability by requiring every registered
motor vehicle to be covered by compensation insurance." " The basis of liabil-
ity under this plan is the causal connection between the automobile, driven by
owner or his permittee, and the injury.4s The liability is fixed by means of a
scale based on that used in the workmen's compensation acts.49
This plan, although not yet adopted in any jurisdiction, shows the same
trend to impose vicarious liability on automobile owners that is present in court
decisions and legislative enactments. The tendency is by no means limited to
this country. Professor Deak has recently pointed out that the French courts
have worked out a doctrine of liability without fault in place of a previously
accepted one of liability for fault only, at least as respects pedestrian accidents. 0
In Canada, three provinces have statutes similar to those adopted in this country
making an owner liable for his permittee's negligence.5 1 England has gone to
the extent of declaring that at common law, the permittee is an agent of the
owner,5 2 and has already adopted an act for compulsory insurance similar to
that adopted in Massachusetts. 53 There is also pending before the House of
Lords a bill which would extend the owner's liability in pedestrian cases almost
to the extent suggested by the compensation plan, liability being based on the
proof that the operation of the motor vehicle is the legal cause of the injury and
contributory negligence is the only defense.14 In Germany the lawful possessor
is liable regardless of fault for damages caused by the operation of a motor ve-
hicle. " Finland, Norway and Denmark have legislation not only requiring com-
pulsory insurance but imposing a liability without fault on owners for injuries
caused by their motor vehicles 0
It is clear that in one way or another the owners of automobiles have been
made responsible for the manner in which they are used by persons whom they
permit to use them, or at least to some more or less restricted class of such
persons. It is equally clear that the trend in the direction of vicarious liability
of this sort is increasing constantly. One cannot escape the conviction that it is
vantages and disadvantages of this plan see, Cbmnpensation for Automobile Accidents: A
Symposium (932) 32 COL. L. REv. 785, I Smith, The Problem and Its Solution; II Lilly,
Criticism of the Proposed Solution; III Dowling, Constitutional Questions.
'_ CO.MPENSATION REPORT, supra note 46, at 138 and 143 (g). See page 238, section 4 of
Director's draft of parts of Compensation Act.
-Id. pp. 133, 138 (b).
"Id. p. 140 (f).
' Deak, Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of the Law of Liability in Europe
(i93I) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 271.
' STATUTES OF ONTARIO, 6 Ed. VII, c. 46, § I3 (I9o6) ; 2 Gao. V, c. 48, §§ 19-23 (9M);
-4 Gao. V, c. 36, §3 (1914) ; STATUTES OF ALBERTA, 1-2 GEO. V, c. 6, §35 (1911-12) ; STAT-
"UTES OF MANITOBA, 5 Gao. V, c. 41, § 14 (1915).
"Parker v. Miller, 42 T. L. R. 408 (i926) ; but cf. Britt v. Galmoye, 44 T. L. R. 294
.'(1928), where a master was held not to be liable for the negligence of a servant to whom he
loaned his motor vehicle for the servant's own benefit.
ROAD TRAFFIC AcT, 20 & 21 GEo. V, c. 43, §§ 35-43 (1930).
*" This proposed bill has recently passed its second reading before the House of Lords.
.See Parliamentary Debates of the House of Lords for June 2, 1932.
Deak, supra note 5o, at 3oo.
"Id. pp. 301-303.
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the character of the automobile, putting it on the ground of being a dangerous
instrumentality or not, which has really led the courts to the rules traveling these
roads to a common end. As has been noted above, the principles enunciated
in imposing liability are not consistent with accepted principles of the law dealing
either with personal or vicarious liability, and are, in many instances, limited to
that field of the law concerned with motor vehicles. The result however is to
add to one defendant, the permittee, who is likely to be irresponsible financially,
another defendant more likely to be responsible, an automobile owner. It is
evident that these theories are tools through which a distinctly social result is
accomplished legally. As one great judge has said, speaking in another particular,
"Finally, when the social needs demand one result rather than another
there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history, and sacrifice
custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends."
G.G.A.
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